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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the matter based on Utah 
Code section 78A-4-103(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue I: The trial court's findings that Mother was credible and telling the truth 
when she testified that Father had engaged in prostitution for many years and the 
trial court's findings that Father lacked credibility for denying the baseless charges 
was clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
Standard of review: "Findings of fact based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside wtless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Preservation: R. 714-15. 
Issue II: The trial court's findings were insufficient to support its conclusion that 
Father had put the children at risk by leaving them in the house with their 
grandmother while he worked at night. 
Standard of review: "A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
concerns the trial court's findings of fact. Those findings will not be disturbed 
unless they are clearly erroneous." Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,476 
(Utah App. 1991 ). 
Preservation: R. 715-16. 
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Issue III: The ttial court erred by expressing a preference for a step-parent 
household over a multigenerational household without any reasonable basis in 
evidence. 
Standard of review: "A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
concerns the trial court's findings of fact. Those findings will not be disturbed 
unless they are clearly erroneous." Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,476 
(Utah App. 1991). 
Preservation: R. 719-20. 
Issue IV: The trial court erred by ordering the children to change elementary 
schools without making a finding that it would be in their best interests. 
Standard of review: The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that 
is reviewed for correctness. See In re B.T.D., 2003 UT App 99, ,r 12, 68 P.3d 
1021. A trial court's findings of fact will not be overturned unless they are clearly 
erroneous, but "to ensure the court acted within its broad discretion, the facts and 
reasons for the court's decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and 
conclusions." See Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993) 
( citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Preservation: R. 716-17. 
Issue V: The trial court erred by having Mother's fiance testify even though the 
exclusionary 1ule had been invoked and he had been present in the courtroom the 
entire day. 
lV 
G 
Standard of review: A trial cowt' s decision to exempt a witness from 
exclusion under rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. See State v. Billsie, 2006 UT 13, 'ff 6, 131 P.3d 239. 
Preservation: R. 717-18; 1036-37. 
Issue VI: The cumulative effect of the several errors requires a remand even if 
some errors, by themselves, are deemed harmless. 
Standard of review: Under the doctrine of cumulative error, an appellate 
court will reverse if the several errors undermine the court's confidence that a fair 
trial was had. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). 
Preservation: R. 720. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code section 30-3-10.2(2)(a), (f). 
In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by ordering joint 
legal custody, the court shall consider the following factors: (a) whether the 
physical, psychological, and emotional needs and development of the child will 
benefit from joint legal or physical custody; [and] ... (f) the preference of the 
child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an 
intelligent preference as to joint legal or physical custody[.] 
Rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
At a party's request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot 
hear other witnesses' testimony. Or the court may do so on its own. But this rule 
V 
does not authorize excluding ... a person whose presence a party shows to be 
essential to presenting the party's claim or defense. 
STATEMENT OF 'fHE CASE 
Father appeals from the trial court's Memorandum Decision, Order, 
Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law entered on June 19, 2015. R. 669-701. 
Father filed a timely motion under rule 52(b) and rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure on July 6 2015. R. 709-10. 1 The trial court issued a Ruling and 
Order on Pending Motions on September 22, 2015, that denied Father's post-
judgment motion. R. 879. Father filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 921. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it gave any weight to Mother's baseless claim 
that Father was a prostitute for several years before their separation. Father denied 
all the allegation and Mother was unable to produce a single piece of 
corroborating evidence. In fact, she claims that she deleted all the evidence. 
Although the trial court did not find sufficient evidence to support a criminal 
charge or to conclude that Father had endangered the children, the trial court did 
determine that Mother's testimony was credible, that the prostitution allegations 
1 This was timely because July 4, 2015, fell on a Saturday, which caused the 
holiday to be observed in the State of Utah on Friday, July 3, 2015. As a result, the 
time for filing the post-judgment motion was extended to the following Monday, 
which was July 6, 2015. 
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reflected poorly on Father's moral character, and that Father's denial's lacked 
credibility. This harmful conclusion lacked sufficient basis in evidence. 
It was etTor for the trial court to conclude that Father had put his children at 
risk by leaving them alone every night while he worked a graveyard shift because 
it was uncontroverted that Grandmother was at home with the children every night 
and could hear them if they needed anything. 
The trial court also erred in determining that Father's living arrangements 
were not ideal even though there was no evidence that would suggest it was 
unstable or W1sustainable in any way. In doing so, the trial court expressed an 
improper preference for step-parent households over multigenerational 
households. 
It was error for the trial court to order the children to change elementary 
schools without considering the children's emotional needs and preference. In 
determining that an elementary school near Mother was better for the children than 
the elementary school they had attended for two school years, the trial court only 
considered standardized test scores and diversity. 
Over Father's objections, Mother's fiance was allowed to testify even 
though the exclusionary rule had been invoked and he had remained in the 
courtroom during the whole first day of trial. This error was prejudicial because 
the fiance was able to testify about things that Mother had said in her testimony. 
Finally, the doctrine of cumulative error requires reversal even if any single 
issue is deemed to be harmless in isolation. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Father and Mother, who have two minor children together, filed for divorce 
in August of 2013. R. 1-15. After separating, Father moved into the basement 
apartment of his mother's home in Salt Lake City, Utah. R. 671. Mother stayed in 
the marital home and then later moved to a townhouse in Draper, Utah. R. 671. 
She was later engaged to a man she met the same month that the divorce was filed. 
R. 1090. They were engaged three months later. R. 1090. On October 8, 2013, a 
commissioner announced temporary orders for custody and parent time. R. 376. 
On February 19, 2014, the trial court entered the same temporary orders 
maintaining full joint physical and legal custody of the children. R. 3 93. Parent 
time was split evenly between Mother and Father. R. 393. Under this arrangement, 
the children continued to attend elementary school at an ethnically diverse 
elementary school in Father's neighborhood where they had been thriving both 
socially and academically. R. 672. Father's schedule revolved around the 
children's schedule, and he continued to work nights as a janitor at high school 
that was ten minutes away. R. 671,672. By maintaining his night schedule, Father 
was able to spend much of his time volunteering at the children's school and was 
able to eat lunch with his children every day. R. 671, 935; see also Petitioner's 
Exhibit 1, 10 .. By all accounts, Father is a good parent with "genuine love for his 
children." T. 671. 
While Father was working from 9 p.m. to 2 a.m. at the nearby high school, 
he would leave the children in the care of his mother (Grandmother) who testified 
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that she was at home every evening and could hear if the children needed 
anything. R. 672. By following this schedule, Father was able to continue to be the 
primaiy caregiver to the children without using outside daycare services. R. 673. 
The children shared a room in the two-bedroom basement apartment of the house 
that had a separate entrance. R. 672. In March 2015:, after living in this 
arrangement for almost two years, a trial was held to establish a permanent 
arrangement. R. 669. 
Father's finances and living arrangements 
During the trial, Father's attorney argued that living in an apartment in his 
mother's home was "beneficial for both [Father] and the children as it does allow 
for better financial assistance at the time. But also it [allows] for [Father] to work 
at night." T. 936. On cross-examination, Father testified that he chose to continue 
to work part-time at night so that he could care for his children. R. 946. He 
explained, "[I]f I worked full-time, then I wouldn't be able to take care of the 
children the way I do. Therefore, it's not an option for me because they would 
need to go to daycare or have significant changes made to their lives." R. 945. 
Grandmother also testified that she only charges Father $200 a month for 
the basement apai1.ment. R. 984. She also said that while Father might seek full-
time employment in a year or so, she did not anticipate renting out the apartment 
to anyone else. R. 984. She further testified that she was at home with the children 
every night and that the separate entrance to the basement apartment was locked. 
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R. 985. She said if the children needed anything, they could simply come up the 
stairs. R. 976-77. 
Based only on this evidence, the trial concluded that Father left his children 
"alone each night." R. 672. The trial comt found that this posed a danger to the 
"safety and well-being of his children," even though it acknowledged that 
Grandmother was at home during those times. R. 672. It also found that "[t]o 
accommodate his part-time earnings, [Father] lives in his mother's house and 
foregoes child care while he is at work-which is concerning to the Court because 
the young children are left unattended during the evening hours." R. 684. Later, it 
found again that "continuing the current schedule-i.e., exposing the Minor 
Children to risk each night by leaving them unattended-is something that should 
not be permitted to continue in the best interest of the Minor Children." R. 686. 
Despite evidence to the contraiy, the trial court found that Father's living 
arrangements were unsustainable. R. 686. It stated that "while there was no 
evidence to suggest that he would not be able to continue to live in his mother's 
basement apartment, his current situation is not ideal." R. 686. The trial court did 
not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that the multi-generational living 
arrangement was "not ideal." 
Moral character 
The trial court noted that a "large part of the trial focused upon [Father's] 
moral character." T. 673. 
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During the trial, evidence was presented of a criminal episode from 2008. 
He had attempted to extort money from a person by threatening to publicize that 
the person was gay. R. 670. The trial court found it troubling that Father took his 
then two-year-old son with him to attempt to collect the money. R. 670. The 
Father ended up serving time in a Maryland jail before moving to Utah and 
manying Mother in 2009. R. 670. Despite being troubled by this criminal episode, 
the trial court noted that the conviction had since been expunged and recognized 
that it had occurred over seven years before the bench trial. R. 673. 
In addition to this, Mother made the shocking allegation in her sworn 
testimony that Father was a prostitute. R. 674. Initially, Mother only testified that 
she had saved some allegedly compromising e-mails from Father on a USB drive, 
but that Father had somehow found it and erased the evidence. R. 1056. Her 
attorney then said, "You told me earlier you don't want to go into too much detail. 
Is that still the case? Okay. We'll just leave it at that then." R. 1056. 
The trial court, however, was not comfortable leaving the vague allegations 
pending. R. 1057. The judge said, "I've got to make a decision in this case about 
what's in these kids' best interest. So if there's some elephant in the room here, I'd 
like to know about it.'' R. 1057. Mother then went on to allege that Father was 
"offering sexual services" on Craigslist. R. 1057. She claimed that there were 
"hundreds, thousands" of e-mails for prostitution going back years. R. 1058. She 
also claimed that he had large quantities of cash from the alleged prostitution. R. 
1058. Because of the seriousness of these previously undisclosed allegations of 
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prostitution, a day was added to the bench trial so that it could be fully addressed. 
R. 669. 
On May 14, 2015, Mother had the opportunity to present all the evidence 
she had that her allegations made under oath were, in fact, true. During her 
testimony on the extra day of trial, Mother testified about details that she claimed 
to remember from the e-mails and things she claimed Father had said when she 
allegedly confronted him. See R. 1116-1133. However, she presented no evidence 
that any of her allegations were true. 
To explain why she could not produce e-mail evidence from the couple's 
desktop computer, she explained that she had deleted the e-mails because she "felt 
bad for him." T. 1134. She also said that she found prostitution e-mails on Father's 
cell phone but that she did not make copies of those e-mails because she did not 
think it was necessary. R. 1137. She did, however, testify that she tried to save a 
USB drive that she claimed she had found to contain compromising pictures of 
Father. R. 1139-40. However, she later claimed that she deleted those as well. R. 
1146. Or, as she alleged earlier, Father may have found the USB and deleted the 
evidence before the divorce. R. 1056. At one point, Father's attorney asked, "So 
we have no way of knowing whether the e-mails actually existed or not, other than 
your testimony?" R. 1146. Mother replied, "Right." T. 1146. 
In regard to the allegations of prostitution, the trial court found that 
Mother's testimony "lacked sufficient detail and her reasons for destroying 
[Father's] email was tenuous." R. 674. Inexplicably, however, the trial court also 
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found that Mother's testimony was credible and that Mother "was telling the truth 
about finding various materials on the computers and USB drives at home." R. 
674. The trial court found that "although there was nothing solidly linking [Father] 
to criminal behavior, the Comt did find [Mother] to be a credible witness. Thus, 
[Father's] categorical denials of the alleged conduct causes the Court to question 
his veracity and honesty.'' R. 683. 
Decision on school attendance 
The trial court heard testimony and saw evidence that the children were 
thriving academically and socially at their current elementary school. R. 672; see 
Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Despite this evidence, the trial court considered only test 
scores compared to diversity in dete1mining which school the children should 
attend. First it found that Mother's school had better test scores and was therefore 
"the better option for the Minor Children." R. 689. It then addressed Father's 
contention that his school had better diversity. It found that while Father "argued 
that the ethnic diversity of [Father's school] should be considered, the significant 
disparity between the schools' academic rankings outweighs any benefits of an 
ethnically diverse culture." R. 689. 
In a post-judgment motion, Father asked the trial court to also consider the 
children's social and emotional well-being in deciding which school the children 
should attend. R. 875. In response, the trial court simply restated its position that 
test scores were better than ethnic diversity, R. 874, and opined that there was no 
Xlll 
proof that the children would face hardships by changing elementary schools, R. 
875. 
Fiance's testimony 
In this case, rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence had been invoked and 
all witnesses except the fiance had been excluded. R. 1036. In response to the trial 
court's inquiry, Mother's attorney said he would call the fiance to testify. R. 1035. 
Father's attorney objected, saying, "He's been in the courtroom the entire time, 
Your Honor .... This isn't a surprise witness. It was known. So ifhe was 
intending [to testify], I think he should have been in the hall." R. 1036. The trial 
court replied, 
Well, I think so too. But, you know, from where I'm sitting 
... I think I need to hear from him. I'm a little concerned that he was 
here during-I didn't realize that. But ... the concern that I have is 
that I want to hear from him, and that probably outweighs any 
concerns that I have ... for evidence. 
R. 1036. 
The trial court stated that the fiance probably would not be able to add 
much, but it still wanted to hear from him. R. 1036. Father's attorney restated his 
objection and then requested that if the trial court allowed the fiance to testify that 
it limit the scope of the testimony. R. 1036. The trial court assured everyone that 
the fiance "certainly won't be able to comment on their relationship and the things 
that he's heard." R. 103 7. 
The next day, the fiance testified that he had a "very strong" relationship 
with the children and that they looked forward to seeing him. R. 1092. He also 
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stated that his mother was available to care for the children and that he had no 
concerns about her watching them. R. 1094. As to employment, the fiance said 
that he was working for the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, but was looking to 
get a job as a police officer somewhere in the Salt Lake Valley area within a year. 
R. 1098. Over Father's objection, the fiance also testified that the children had told 
him that Father had told the children that they were not supposed to like him and 
that Father did not like him either. R. 1102. Mother had testified earlier that Father 
had said mean things about the fiance and that he did not like him. R. 1048-50. 
The trial court's conclusions 
Both Father and Mother agreed to joint legal and physical custody, and the 
trial comt was asked to decide only who would have ultimate decision-making 
authority, who would be the primary custodial parent; and which school the 
children would attend. R. 680. The parties had agreed to a fifty-fifty split of 
parent-time in the summer. R. 680. To make these decisions, the trial court 
considered several factors and determined whether each factor favored Father, 
favored Mother or was neutral. The children's preference was neutral. R. 681. All 
parties agreed to an arrangement that would keep the siblings together, therefore, 
that factor was also neutral. R. 680. The relative strength of the children's bond 
with Father and Mother was neutral. R. 680. The general interest in maintaining 
the status quo was neutral, but only because the trial cowt considered Father's 
living arrangements to be unsustainable. R. 682. Otherwise, this factor would have 
favored Father. 
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On the moral character and emotional stability factor, the trial court 
considered Father's expunged criminal episode from seven years before and 
considered the unsupported allegations of prostitution from Mother. R. 683. It 
found that in "light of all the noted facts and circumstances, and especially the 
criminal incident ... , the Court has serious reservations regarding [Father's] 
ability to make sound decisions in the best interests of the Minor Children. R. 683. 
As a result, this factor weighed heavily in favor of Mother. R. 683. 
The ability to function as a parent factor was neutral. R. 684. The duration 
and depth of desire for custody factor was neutral. R. 684. The trial court found 
that the ability to provide personal rather than sWTogate care factor would have 
favored Father because he worked nights and had ample time to volunteer at the 
children's school and spend time with them during the day. R. 684. However, the 
trial court once again complained that Father was leaving the children "unattended 
during the evening hours," even though Grandmother was at home with them. R. 
684. At the same time, the trial court found that the fiance would be able to 
provide surrogate care for the children while Mother was at work. R. 685. It 
therefore concluded that even though this factor currently favored Father, it would 
be a neutral factor in the future. R. 685. 
The trial court found that the neither parent had a drug or alcohol problem, 
therefore, this factor was neutral as well. R. 685. Neither parent had relinquished 
custody in the past, so that was neutral. R. 685. There were no concerns about 
religious compatibility. R. 686. 
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On the factor of kinship, the trial court favored Mother's potential step-
parent household over Father's multi-generational household. It found that 
Grandmother had a good relationship with the minor childi·en. R. 686. It then 
found that the fiance also had a good relationship with the minor children. R. 686. 
Inexplicably, the trial court concluded, based on these findings, that this factor 
favored Mother. R. 686. 
Under the financial factor, the trial court once again complained that Father 
was somehow putting the children at risk by leaving them home at night with the 
grandmother. R. 686-87. The trial court determined, contrary to the proffered 
evidence, that Father would not be able to "continue with this arrangement for an 
indefinite time. While there was no evidence to suggest that he would not be able 
to continue to live in his mother's basement apartment, his current situation is not 
ideal." R. 686. The trial court then considered Mother's income and the fiances 
potential income to conclude that the financial factor favored Mother. R. 687. 
There was no evidence of abuse or neglect. R. 687. The trial court found 
that both Mother and Father needed to work better together, but the factor of 
whether the parents could foster a positive relationship was neutral. R. 687. The 
factor of communication between the parents was neutral as well. R. 686. 
Finally, under a factor that the trial court titled "Other Considerations," it 
compared the standardized test scores of Mother's preferred elementary school 
with the standardized test scores of the children's current school, and determined 
that this outweighed any benefit from ethnic diversity. R. 689. Based on this alone, 
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the trial court ordered that the children change elementary schools. R. 689. The 
trial court also ruled that Mother would have final decision-making authority. R. 
690. 
On July 6, 2015, Father filed a post-judgment motion asking the trial court 
to amend its findings to remove all references to the unsupported claim that Father 
was a prostitute except to indicate that Mother had made baseless allegations of 
criminal conduct to the detriment of her own credibility. R. 712. Father also asked 
the trial court to consider the other issues now raised on appeal. R. 712-13. The 
trial court refused to amend its findings in any way, R. 879, and Father filed a 
timely notice of appeal, R. 921. 
XVlll 
~-
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred by giving credit to Mother's salacious and entirely 
unsubstantiated allegation that Father was a prostitute. 
Throughout its decision, the trial court made several references to Mother's 
unsupported assertion that Father was a prostitute. Because this allegation was 
salacious, inflammatory, and deeply hanning to Father and because there was not 
a single scintilla of evidence produced to support it, the trial court erred in giving 
it any credit and, as a result, erred in its credibility determination of the witnesses. 
In general, "[f]indings of fact based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a). "It is the province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of 
witnesses," and it will not be second-guessed "where there is a reasonable basis to 
support its findings." See Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991). In 
general, "a party challenging a factual finding or sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a verdict will almost certainly fail to cany its burden of persuasion on 
appeal if it fails to marshal" the evidence. See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r 42, 
326 P.3d 645. 
Even granted all the deference that is due to the trial court as the trier of 
fact, the findings on the prostitution allegations were clearly erroneous. The trial 
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court made a credibility determination based on the allegation, but that 
determination also lacks a reasonable basis in fact. The following is a marshaling 
of all the evidence on the record regarding Mother's claim that Father was a 
prostitute: 
1. Mother first raised only vague allegations of misconduct involving e-
mails, and her attorney seemed to discourage her from the topic. R. 
1056. Her attorney said, "You told me earlier you don't want to go into 
too much detail. Is that still the case? Okay. We'll just leave it at that 
then." R. I 056. 
2. Mother, however, went on to allege that Father was "offering sexual 
services" on Craigslist. R. 1057. She claimed that there were "hundreds, 
thousands" of e-mails for prostitution going back years. R. 1058. She 
also claimed that he had large quantities of cash from the alleged 
prostitution. R. 1058. 
3. Mother later testified in a day of trial scheduled specifically for the 
prostitution charges that she now remembered details from the e-mails 
and things she claimed Father had said when she allegedly confronted 
him. See R. 1116-1133. Beyond her testimony, however, she presented 
no evidence. 
4. To explain why she could not produce e-mail evidence from the 
couple's desktop computer, she explained that she had deleted the e-
mails because she "felt bad for him." R. 1134. 
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5. She also said that she found prostitution e-mails on Father's cell phone 
but that she did not make copies of those e-mails because she did not 
think it was necessary. R. 1137. She did, however, testify that she tried 
to save a USB drive that she claimed she had found to contain 
compromising pictures of Father. R. 1139-40. However, she later 
claimed that she deleted those as well. R. 1146. Or, as she alleged 
earlier, Father may have found the USB and deleted the evidence before 
the divorce. R. 1056. 
6. At one point, Father's attorney asked, "So we have no way of knowing 
whether the e-mails actually existed or not, other than your testimony?" 
R. 1146. Mother replied, "Right." R. 1146. 
7. In contrast, Father's testimony directly refuted all the details of 
Mother's unsupported allegations. R. 1188-1204. 
8. Father provided a screenshot of all of his Craigslist postings from his e-
mail address. R. 1198. Besides postings regarding a condo and a car 
seat, there were no e-mails involving Craigslist. R. 1199. 
Based on all of this, the trial court determined that Mother's "testimony 
lacked sufficient detail and her reasons for destroying [Father's] email was 
tenuous." R. 674. Inexplicably, the trial court nevertheless found Mother's 
allegations to be credible and her account to be true. Id. The trial court determined 
that the years of prostitution had not endangered the children, but it also found that 
the prostitution reflected poorly on Father's moral character. This obviously 
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inconsistent result seems to indicate that the trial court was aware of the lack of 
basis for this determination. If Fath.er truly was a prostitute as Mother claimed, 
committing countless sex acts for money over the course of several years, then 
there is no way to conclude that this kind of behavior would not endanger the 
children in any way. If Mother truly believed that Father was a practicing 
prostitute for years, then she should have taken steps to protect her children from 
his blatantly criminal and morally reprehensible behavior. It seems the trial court 
is attempting to find Mother's claims credible while not finding that she allowed 
her children to be endangered by the alleged criminal activity. It therefore ruled 
that 
although there was nothing solidly linking [Father] to defined 
criminal behavior, the Court did find [Mother] to be a credible 
witness. Thus, [Father's] categorical denials of the alleged conduct 
causes the Court to question his veracity and honesty. 
R. 683. As a result, the trial court seems to find that Father was a prostitute when it 
would reflect negatively on his character, but that Father was not a prostitute when 
it would reflect negatively on Mother's lack of effort to protect her children or 
lack of honesty on the witness stand. As Father argued in his motion to amend the 
judgment, Mother's testimony cannot be untrue and credible at the same time. R. 
767. "[E]ither [Father] is a prostitute and is engaging in immoral and illegal 
activities, or [Mother's] testimony was not credible." Id. The trial court even 
admitted that "there is insufficient evidence to show that [Father's] actions were 
illegal or otherwise placed the Minor Children in harm's way." R. 674. Still, it 
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believed the allegations to be true and relied upon them to make a determination of 
Father's moral character. R. 682-83. 
There was absolutely no evidence presented, beyond Mother's self-serving 
assertions, that Father had ever prostituted himself in any way. The trial court 
recognized that her story lacked detail and that her reasons for destroying the only 
evidence were tenuous. It was clearly erroneous, therefore, for the trial court to 
have given any weight to the allegations. To add insult to injury, the trial court 
actually discounted Father's credibility for vehemently denying the allegations. 
There is an apt Latin proverb on this subject: Quod gratis asseritur, gratis 
negatur-What is asserted without evidence may be denied without evidence. 
Mother made a salacious and wholly unsupported claim against Father. The only 
possible response to such a charge is to deny it, and to deny it categorically. As a 
result, there is no evidence to support the trial court's findings that Mother's 
testimony was true and that she was a credible witness. 
A. The prostitution allegations harmed Father's substantial rights in 
the proceeding. 
The false allegations of prostitution were highly prejudicial in this 
proceeding even though neither Father nor Mother have an unspotted record on 
moral issues. If an error "affects the substantial rights of the parties," a court must 
not disregard it. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61. 
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An error is hannful when "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable outcome for the appe11ant." See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993). 
Despite the fact that both Mother and Father have had moral failings in the 
past, the inflammatory false allegation of prostitution was still prejudicial to 
Father. It is true that Father had a lapse of judgment seven years before the trial 
that resulted in a criminal conviction. R. 670, 673. But it is also true that Mother 
had lapses in moral judgment as well, although none that involved a crime. The 
trial court found that Mother had "engaged in 'phone sex' and sent nude 
photographs of herself to someone she met online after the parties were separated, 
but while the Minor Children were living with her." R. 674. 
So while neither party had a spotless moral record, only Father was accused 
of being a prostitute. This charge is so salacious and inflammatory that it is 
practically per se prejudicial. How can a trial court conclude that a parent has been 
a prostitute for years while living in the familial home and then consider that a 
harmless detail? The outcome would have been better for Father if the trial court 
had not believed the allegations that Father was a prostitute. Even considering the 
past criminal episode, it is seemingly untenable to claim that this would not have 
harmed Father in any way. Instead, it is likely that Father would have had a better 
outcome absent the unsupported allegations of prostitution. It is also important to 
note that if the trial court had not believed Mother's unsupported allegations, this 
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would have hurt her credibility. Thus, it was even more likely that the trial court 
would have found a more favorable result for Father. 
Considering the mutual history, the inflammatory and salacious nature of 
the allegation, and the subsequent credibility determination, it is clear that the trial 
court's clearly erroneous findings prejudiced Father in this case. 
II. The Court's findings are insufficient to support its conclusion that Father 
endangered the children by leaving them alone a night. 
The trial court found that Father was putting the safety of his children at 
risk by leaving the them alone each night while he went to work, but there is no 
reasonable basis in evidence to support this conclusion. 
In general, "[fjindings of fact based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a). "It is the province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of 
witnesses," and it will not be second-guessed "where there is a reasonable basis to 
support its findings." See Reedv. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991). In 
general, "a party challenging a factual finding or sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a verdict will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on 
appeal if it fails to marshal" the evidence. See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r 42, 
326 P.3d 645. 
The following is a marshaling of all the evidence regarding this issue: 
7 
1. Father "lives in the basement of his mother's house." R. 672. 
2. The basement apartment is "a separate ... apartment with two 
bedrooms." R. 672. 
3. "The Minor Children share a bedroom." R. 672. 
4. "The basement apartment has its own entrance." R. 672. 
5. Father worked at night from 9 p.m. to 2 a.m. R. 672. 
6. Both Father and Grandmother "testified that [Grandmother] is upstairs 
every evening and can hear the children if they need anything." R. 672. 
7. The separate entrance to the basement apartment is locked when Father is 
working at nights and the children have never left the apartment without an adult 
being aware. R. 985. 
Based only on this evidence, the trial court concluded that Father was 
putting the children at risk each night by leaving them W1attended while he 
worked. R. 672, 684, 686-87. But the uncontroverted testimony is that the 
children were at home with their Grandmother, who was just up the stairs and 
could hear them if they needed anything during the night. The trial court is 
apparently ruling that anyone caring for minor children must sleep on the same 
level of the house as the children. Otheiwise they are leaving their children 
unattended at night. Such a conclusion is unwarranted and is not supported by any 
basis in the evidence. 
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This erroneous conclusion greatly prejudiced Father in the proceeding. The 
trial court relied on this finding to draw negative inferences against Father in the 
factors of surrogate care, R. 684, and financial conditions, R. 686-87. 
Because the trial court clearly erred in determining that Father put his 
children at risk at night by leaving them unattended when they were undisputedly 
at home with Grandmother, and because this error harmed Father, this Court 
should reverse and remand. 
Ill. The trial court favored a step-parent household over a multigenerational 
household without a sufficient basis in the evidence. 
Throughout its decision, the trial court expressed a preference for Mother's 
potential step-parent household structure over the admittedly stable and 
functioning multigenerational household structure of Father's family without any 
reasonable basis in evidence. As noted earlier, a trial court must have a reasonable 
basis to support its findings. See Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991). 
In Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987), this Court made it clear 
that it will not condone a finding of fact that penalizes a woman for not adhering 
to the "traditional role." Id. at 203-04. While the rule in Marchant was applied to 
a custody determination that penalized a woman for working outside of the home, 
the same principle could apply to a man who is the primary caregiver or to a man 
who lives in a multigenerational household. In any event, a parent's perceived 
failure to adhere to a judge's traditional view of family life should never be a 
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factor in a detetmination of custody. The U.S. Census Bureau defines 
multigenerational households to include "a household, a child of the householder, 
and a grandchild of the householder." Daphne A. Lofquist, Multigenerational 
Households: 2009-2011), www.Census.gov (October 2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acsbrl 1-03 .pelf. According to the Pew 
Research Center, "[a] record 57 million Americans, or 18.1% of the population of 
the United States, lived in multi-generational family households in 2012, double 
the number who lived in such households in 1980." Richard Fry and Jeffrey S. 
Passel, In Post-Recession Era, Young Adults Drive Continuing Rise in Multi-
Generational Living, Pew Research Center (July 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/07 /17 /in-postrecession-era-young-adults-
drive-continuing-rise-in-multi-generational-living/#fn-19695-1. So, while 
multigenerational households are increasingly popular because of the financial 
stability and benefits to family life, they are still a minority family structure in the 
United States. 
In this case, there was no evidence presented and no findings made to 
explain why a more traditional step-parent household should be treated any 
differently than a slightly less traditional multigenerational household. The only 
relevant evidence was that Grandmother testified that she only charges Father 
$200 a month for the basement apartment. R. 984. She also said that while Father 
might seek full-time employment in a year or so, she did not anticipate renting out 
the apartment to anyone else. R. 984. 
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The trial court, however, found that Father's multigenerational household 
was "not ideal." R. 686. While the trial court concluded that Mother's fiance "will 
likely be able to be a surrogate caretaker of the Minor Children," see R. 685, the 
trial court at the same time found that Father was "exposing the Minor Children to 
risk each night" by leaving them in the house with Grandmother, see R. 686. 
There is no evidentiary basis to explain why the fiance would be an acceptable 
surrogate care provider while the children's biological grandmother would not. 
Under the analysis of financial conditions, the trial court considered the fact 
that the fiance's income will be added to Mother's and concluded that Mother's 
"financial situation is better than [Father's]." R. 687. There is no explanation, 
however, about why the trial court did not also consider Grandmother's income in 
Father's favor. In fact, the trial court treated the financial benefits of a 
multigenerational household as a liability for Father, citing his reduced monthly 
rent as evidence of instability and unsustainability. See R. 686. 
Most tellingly, the trial court admitted that there was no basis in the 
evidence for its conclusions. It wrote, "[W]hile there is no evidence to suggest that 
[Father] would not be able to continue to live in his mother's basement apartment, 
his current situation is not ideal." R. 686 ( emphasis added). Based on this, the trial 
court concluded that the financial situation factor favored Mother. R. 686-87. It 
also relied on this assumption to support its conclusion that kinship factor favored 
Mother, albeit slightly. R. 686. Finally, the trial court relied on this assumption to 
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determine that the factor of the ability to provide personal rather than surrogate 
care currently favored Father, but that his situation was unsustainable and this 
factor would ultimately be neutral. R. 685. As a result, Father was prejudiced by 
the error to assume that multigenerational households are less stable or somehow 
less desirable than the more traditional step-parent household. Therefore, this 
Court should reverse and remand. 
IV. The trial court erred in considering only standardized test scores 
compared to diversity in making a determination about which school the 
children should attend. 
In determining which school the children should attend, the trial court only 
considered standardized test scores and diversity, but refused to consider the 
children's psychological and emotional needs. When considering a change to a 
joint custody arrangement, a trial court should consider the impact on the best 
interests of the children as articulated in Utah Code section 30-3-10.2. 
This includes the "emotional needs ... of the child" and "the preference of 
the child." See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(2)(a), (f) (LexisNexis 2013). The trial 
court, however, did not consider the children's preference, their emotional needs, 
or the general interest of maintaining the status quo when it ordered the children to 
attend a new elementary school. See R. 680-81. Instead the trial court analyzed the 
school question under "other considerations" as an addendum to the factors in the 
best-interests analysis. See R. 688-89. One of the most traumatic things that can 
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happen to a young child is to change schools. They lose all their friends and 
academic support system. It is massive deviation from the status quo. In this case, 
Father has actually changed jobs to work at the children's elementary school. See 
R. 717. Furthermore, Father presented evidence that showed the children were 
thriving at their current school and exceeding the standardized-test requirements. 
The trial court did not consider the fact that the children were in a school where 
they had friends and were thriving and where one of their parents would see them 
every day. Instead, the children were transferred to a new school based solely on 
the school's standardized test scores and the convenience of the parent-time 
schedule. See R. 689. Because this change in school is not in the best interests of 
the children and because the trial court failed to analyze the impact of such a 
change within that framework, this Court should reverse and remand. 
V. Mother's fiance should not have been allowed to testify. 
Despite Father's objections, Mother's fiance was allowed to testify even 
though he was present in the courtroom during the trial and all other witnesses 
were excluded under rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. "At a party's 
request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other 
witnesses' testimony." Utah R. Evid. 615. 
A judge may exempt a party from the operation of rule 615 if the witness is 
a "person whose presence party shows to be essential to presenting the party's 
claim or defense." Id. R. 615(c). If a party challenges a judge's decision to exempt 
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a witness from being excluded, the party must show that it was prejudiced by the 
decision. State v. Billsie, 2006 UT 13, 'lf 6, 131 P.3d 239. 
In this case, rule 615 had been invoked and all witnesses should have been 
excluded. Mother's attorney said he could call the fiance to testify, if it would help 
the trial court. R. 1035. Father's att01ney objected, saying, "He's been in the 
courtroom the entire time, Your Honor .... This isn't a surprise witness. It was 
known. So if he was intending [ to testify], I think he should have been in the hall." 
R. 1036. The trial court replied, 
Well, I think so too. But, you know, from where I'm sitting 
... I think I need to hear from him. I'm a little concerned that he was 
here during-I didn't realize that. But ... the concern that I have is 
that I want to hear from him, and that probably outweighs any 
concerns that I have ... for evidence. 
R. 1036. 
At no point in time did Mother or the trial court attempt to argue that an 
exception to rule 615 applied to the fiance. The trial court stated that the fiance 
probably would not be able to add much, but it still wanted to hear from him. R. 
1036. Father's attorney restated his objection and then requested that if the trial 
court allowed the fiance to testify that it limit the scope of the testimony. R. 1036. 
The trial court assured everyone that the fiance "certainly won't be able to 
comment on their relationship and the things that he's heard." R. 1037. 
That is exactly what the fiance testified about during the second day of the 
trial. The fiance testified that he had a "very strong" relationship with the children 
and that they looked forward to seeing him. R. 1092. He also stated that his mother 
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was available to care for the children and that he had no concerns about her 
watching them. R. 1094. As to employment, the fiance said that he was working 
for the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, but was looking to get a job as a police 
officer somewhere in the Salt Lake Valley area within a year. R. 1098. In his job 
at the time, he ea1ned around $35,000. R. 1098. Over Father's objection, the fiance 
also testified that the children had told him that Father had told the children that 
they were not supposed to like him and that Father did not like him either. R. 
1102. This was particularly egregious because Mother had testified that Father had 
said mean things about the fiance and that he did not like him. R. 1048-50. This is 
precisely the kind of hatm that rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence is intended 
to avoid. 
This error was prejudicial because the trial court found the fiance to be a 
credible witness that supported Mother's position. See R. 679. Of the fiance, the 
Court wrote, "He testified of [Mother's] positive parenting abilities and his good 
relationship with the Minor Children. Mr. Barnes appeared to be a credible witness 
and a positive role model." Id. In the best-interests analysis, the trial court relied 
on the fiance' s testimony to conclude that he "will likely be able to be a surrogate 
caretaker of the Minor Children." R. 685. Under the kinship section of the best-
interests analysis, the trial court wrote: "The Court, having observed [the fiance] 
testify, believes that he testified credibly, cares for the Minor Children, and will 
likely act as a capable and caring step-parent." R. 686. The Court concluded that 
this factor of the analysis favored Mother. Id. The trial court also considered the 
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fiance' s testimony about his income in determining that the financial factor of the 
best-interests analysis favored Mother. R. 687. Finally, the fiance was able to 
bolster Mother's contention that Father would not foster a good relationship with 
the fiance. The trial court agreed with Mother and found that Father "may be 
unable to support a positive relationship" with the fiance. R. 688. 
The fiance, however, had an unfair advantage. He was able to observe how 
everyone else testified. He could see which factors the trial cowt deemed 
important and adjust his testimony accordingly. As a result, he was able to 
significantly bolster Mother's case in a way that prejudiced Father. For this error, 
the Court should reverse and remand. 
VI. Cumulative error has prejudiced Father. 
Each one of the errors described above was harmful to Father in shifting the 
balance of the factors in favor of Mother. However, even if all of the above errors 
are deemed individually harmless, the cumulative effect of the errors has 
prejudiced Father. When the cumulative effect of several errors undermines 
confidence in a decision, the Court should vacate the trial court's decision. See 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). In this case, the cumulative 
effect of the several errors described above requires this Com1 to reverse and 
remand. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Father respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
and remand. 
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